I was curious as to the tone and nature of articles on warfare. There are many, including this one on Small War or as they put it, "Petite-Guerre." I quote it in its entirety below. The translation is mine and will soon appear on the University of Michigan's internet project attempting to get all of the entries translated into English. See: http://quod.lib.umich.edu/d/did for their whole effort thus far.
The value of this is to see how the term, "Small War" did not originate with the English and the publication of Small Wars: Their Principle and Practice published in 1906 by C. E. Callwell. It was around since Maurice de Saxe, who the entry's author apparently read from, to acquaint himself with the subject. Diderot managed to get this volume published sometime between 1755 and 1766.
The greatest change from today regarding Small Wars, or what we might call UW, is the utter lack of political implications. Such operations are merely a method to achieve certain military objectives. What remains the same however is the desire to link it with the overall main effort. Furthermore, there is the emphasis on the skill and intelligence of those conducting it as it requires greater imagination and skill. No change from today....
"Small - War, is that which is done by detachment or parties, whose object is to scout out the enemy's intent, to observe its movements, to harass it or badger it in all its operations, to surprise its convoyes, to establish commissary and sustainment, &c. The detachments or the parties which one thus sends to the war are composed of light troops & the regular troops cavalry & infantry, tailored and sized according to the various tasks which they must carry out. This kind of war requires a great deal of intelligence & capacity in the officers who conduct it. They must know how to distinguish the strength and weakness of the enemy army's camp and position, & to judge advantages which the nature of the the terrain can give to attack it or surprise it, and in the lines of its movements are where it must forage. It is also necessary that they can penetrate the intentions of the enemy due to his movements, & that they observe it rather exactly not to be misled. Parties or detachments led by skilful & experienced officers are absolutely necessary for the safety of the army. By this means a General will never be surprised, because he is always informed with information of all the movements & all the operations of his adversary. He also makes communications difficult for the enemy and exploits it for his army, bringing much of the food & the ammunition to his army, & he finds the means of extending support for him up to 30, 40, & even 50 miles from his camp. By the means of these parties, one also assures the army's steps, & one prevents the enemy from coming to disturb them or upset them. When it is not absolutely necessary to know enemy actions, small parties are more convenient than large ones, because they ahve greater capability to hide & ambush with greater advantage around the enemy camp, to surprise with celerity with which they can move: these small parties must be cavalry. Maurice de Saxe desired not above fifty men. They must go by the least guarded and most circuitous, lie in ambush in the wood & other enemy occupied places, & try to take prisoners. Those who command these parties must always be confident of their ability to escape, & make sure not to be cut off. One divides his troop into small detachments which support the other detachments, so that if the first are recalled, the others can also be withdrawn. When the parties or the detachments are intended to conduct operations, & to force small cities, castles, & other places capable of some defense, one makes them larger. Their command then requires much the same coherence & the same intelligence as the operations done between the large armies. It is necessary to take all the more care for the maintenance and operation of its units & in order to avoid surprises, that one finds in enemy territory surrounded on all sides; that it is important to be quick with the companies not to give the enemy time to gather troops to oppose them, & that great resolve & understanding of the country is needed to elude all the difficulties that the enemy can employ forcing one to retreat."
So, its almost all there.... gather intelligence, forage, exploit deception opportunities, coordinate with other like parties and the main forces, and tailor the force to the task. But no mention of indigenous forces or working with partisans or what today would be called Unconventional Warfare. Funny how Diderot's desire to largely "change the way people think" actually did in so many ways, but this particular entry, on its own remains locked in the old way of conducting Small War. Paradoxically, the Enlightenment would provoke ideologies that would radically change Small War into UW. Or did it? I'm not convinced that the author wasn't missing something all along. More books to read to sort that out....
